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Abstract. Just-in-time deliveries are crucial for many industries. They are particularly essential when the properties of the delivered resource or the demanding processes are sensitive in time. Rigid, centralized planning tends to fail, especially in dynamic environments with distributed decisions and control. Under
the constraints of distributed decisions and control, auctions promise an efficient allocation of resources. However, a dedicated design of auctions for justin-time deliveries, which can be incorporated into the design of an IT artifact, is
still lacking. We contribute a linear and a quadratic multi-attribute scoring rule
for an automated execution by software. We evaluate the artifact in a simulation
experiment and reveal the effects of the scoring rules for just-in-time deliveries.
Our results provide evidence that the artifact effectively coordinates just-in-time
deliveries, which also holds when considering one additional side constraint.
Keywords: Just-in-Time Delivery, Multi-attribute Auction, Scoring Rule, Distributed Decisions and Control

1

Introduction

Just-in-time (JiT) deliveries are demanded by many industries [9, 13]. In general, JiT
deliveries are encouraged by the reduction of stocks so as to save storage costs and
place, to release tied capital, and to diminish the risk of sunken costs [10, 16, 22]. The
risk of sunken costs exists in particular for resources with perishable properties. The
road pavement process illustrates the JiT requirements: As soon as the paver’s asphalt
reservoir runs low it has to be provided with asphalt in the right temperature for further processing. The paver must not wait, because discontinuances during the processing lead to irregularities in the pavement. As a result of poor paving, the stability
of the road is affected negatively, which then causes high costs for maintenance and
repair and impairs the driving safety [5].
When just-in-time deliveries are critical in environments where prospects are hardly possible, it is advisable to establish short-cyclic demands, so that an adjustment to
unforeseen circumstances is possible. The use of IT enhances the adaptability to environmental dynamics and the availability of IT permeates throughout all industries.
Yet, many production processes are constituted as a supply chain with distributed
decisions and control. An integrated conceptualization would fail, because there is no
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effective way to impose directives hierarchically. This situation is prevalent in the
nature of many supply chains.
The construction industry sets a good example. During the production process,
numerous providers are involved, and each of them complies with her own objectives.
Supply chain management and the maintenance of just-in-time deliveries is a tremendous issue [17, 18]. Anyhow, the construction machines are increasingly equipped
with digital sensor technology, as well as with digital information processing technology. Coordination relevant data is or becomes available and usable. The problem is,
indeed, the distribution of decisions and control.
To address this situation we draw from the Mechanism Design Theory (MDT) and
provide an auction as coordination artifact. Auctions are determined by an explicit set
of rules [14], and hence their concepts are suitable for adoption by IT engineers. The
primary outcome of an auction is classically an allocation. However, we utilize auctions also as a mechanism to find the best agreement for certain characteristics of a
delivery order among multiple providers. The characteristics are reflected by the general objectives of JiT deliveries, and encompass the dimensions (1) prize, (2) quantity,
(3) condition (quality), (4) delivery time, and (5) place of delivery. We incorporate
the dimensions as attributes for an auction, and design a linear and a quadratic multiattribute scoring rule to determine the provider who is awarded a delivery order. The
linear scoring rule scores proportionally to what extent the JiT objectives are accomplished. The quadratic scoring rule allows for a more sophisticated scoring, since the
marginal scoring is not constant. By providing and evaluating our multi-attribute auction, we contribute a method for the coordination of JiT deliveries.
The auction as coordination method allows for an efficient allocation of delivery
orders to the best-suited deliverer. The deliverer might also be detected from one or
several contractual partners’ fleet of transport vehicles. An advantage of this procedure, in comparison to a fixed schedule, is that the order retrievals can be adjusted
individually to the currently present circumstances. On a road construction site, for
example, when there is an interruption in the paving process, one can observe the
situation where the asphalt delivering trucks back up at the paver. As a consequence
the unnecessarily waiting trucks are later on lacking for the provision of supplies.
We pose the following research question: What is the effect of using multi-attribute
auctions for just-in-time deliveries? From an IS perspective, we investigate the effect
of our IT artifact on the organization of a supply chain. To answer this question, we
report the results of a simulation of the artifact. We reveal the implications of the
respectively implemented scoring rules for the coordination of just-in-time deliveries,
and compare both scoring rules.
Relevance of our research is indicated by the example from above, but also given
due to the research gap in this field of IS research. Multi-attribute auctions have already been realized for computer-aided task- and service-allocation [8, 11, 12, 20].
Still, a design of auctions for JiT deliveries is lacking.
The paper is structured in the following way: Sec. 2 provides an overview of the
state of the art. In sec. 3 our scoring rules are developed as a coordination artifact.
Sec. 4 reports the evaluation of our artifact. We close our paper with a conclusion and
an outlook in sec. 5.
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2

State of the Art

The paper at hand relates to other approaches which aim at inducing JiT performances
through auctions. Witzel & Endriss [21] augment multi-unit auctions with up to four
time constraints. The formulation of narrow time restrictions enables auctions for justin-time deliveries. However, the approach is driven by a logic calculus and thus the
assessment of the time constraints is either ‘true’ or ‘false’. Soft winner determination
for the case that no bidder fits the time restrictions is not possible, and so is the determination of ordering relations not possible either.
Another approach is presented by Nunes et al. [15]. They consider task allocation
with time-sensitive single-item sequential auctions for spatially distributed robots.
Therefore, each task is assigned an earliest start time, a latest finish time, and an estimated processing time. An appropriate small choice of the time windows addresses
JiT requirements. However, integrative multi-attribute auctions are not addressed.
An early model for multi-attribute auctions has been inquired by Che [7]. Che has
involved two attributes, one for the prize p, and one for the quality q. The utility for a
bidding agent b  AB in dependence of these two attributes is determined by
ub,  p, q  V q  p , where V(q) is the valuation of the given quality value. In particular, V must be differentiated with respect to just-in-time deliveries.
Our paper is also related to work about allocation of computational jobs in service
networks, as multi-attribute auctions are used. Dinther et al. [8] incorporate automated
negotiations with a scoring rule for services. The scoring rule is of the form
S ( )  i i  i , where  is a configuration of a complex service. The service is



composed in a service network and the index i indicates a node which provides a service. Dinther et al. provide results for the formation of service networks. However,
the problem at hand, pertaining to just-in-time deliveries, is to find one sole agent
who is best suited for the fulfillment of a demand.
Multi-attribute auctions have also been used to improve sustainability in cloud
computing. Widmer et al. [20] factor in the expected energy consumption for the allocation of services in cloud computing. In their simulative evaluation, Widmer et al.
assigned different weights to the prize of a service and its energy consumption. They
finally assessed the utility ratio of the outcome. However, the scoring model directly
incorporates energy specific key figures, and thus a transfer onto the inducement of
just-in-time deliveries is not given.
In an experimental setting, Haak & Gimpel [11] have investigated bidding rules for
the automation of negotiations for service level agreements (SLA). They compared
three rules for multi-attribute auctions, among others with respect to individual rationality and incentive compatibility. The rules are: (1) Tuple-bidding, where the customer proposes a tuple of price and quality and the seller accepts or declines. (2)
Scoring-bidding, where the customer gives a scoring function and the seller sets a
quality and a prize accordingly or declines. (3) Discount-bidding, which is the same
as (2) but allows for discounts. The auction rules only compare prize with quality
directly. It is not specified how different quality attributes interact with each other and
how the interplay influences the overall outcome.
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Another approach for the automation of the negotiation for SLA by multi-attribute
auctions is given by Kieninger et al. [12]. They consider a multi-attribute offer as a
tuple of service incident patterns, such as outages or disfunctions. The winner of the
auction is determined by the expected business costs, which are computed by multiplying the frequencies of the service incident patterns with the business costs for a
service. However, the last two presented papers do not fit to the problem of inducing
just-in-time deliveries.
Our paper is also related to work of Bichler et al. [4], who give a comprehensive
overview of the usage of auctions for procurement with IT. In an earlier work, Bichler
[1] has investigated the more general question, whether multi-attribute auctions
achieve better outcomes than traditional auctions for the prize of an item only. Later,
Bichler & Kalagnanam [2] have applied the concept of multi-attribute auctions to
configurable offers and to auctions with multiple sources. Although progress has been
made, regarding multi-attribute auctions with IT, the design of scoring rules for the
automated procurement of just-in-time deliveries has not been inquired, yet.
Quadratic scoring rules were not implemented in any of the preceding works.

3

Artifact Design

3.1

Formal Framework

We take an auction as a mechanism for resource allocation between one auctioneer
and multiple bidders, which is constituted by a bidding process over potentially several attributes of one or more items [3]. The items are the resources that shall be allocated, and the attributes determine the characteristics of what an agreement must be
found − besides the pure allocation of the item. The notion of a resource, i.e. of the
items, is to be understood in a broad sense that covers tangible goods, as well as intangible goods, or services, so objects, as well as performances, or even commitments
to eventually execute a task. The objective of the auction is to optimize the agreement
for the attributes from the auctioneer’s viewpoint, respectively to find the bidder with
whom the best agreement can be found.
We employ the following basic model: I is the set of items, and B  (I) is the set
of item bundles from the power set over I. C is the set of attributes (characteristics),
where Yc  IR is the value range of c  C. Each bundle is attributed with an array of
characteristics to which we refer with   B  CM . Because the relation  is functional, we obtain the attributes of a bundle b  B by (b). For the sake of notation, please
be aware that for each bundle, M may be a different dimension reflecting the number
of attributes. Each attribute is assigned a respective value by  :   YM, where
Y  cC Yc .



A is the set of agents, the set of bidders is AB  A, and the set of auctioneers is
AA  A. Each agent a  A gets the utility u(a, ). Note, that  is in fact a triple
B  CM  YM, which means that not only the attributes and its values are essential,
regarding the utility for an agent, but the bundle itself, too. Let us exemplify the formality (later we will simplify the notation).
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Example 1: The item set
I = {Asphalt, Concrete}
consists of a transport order for asphalt and for concrete. There are only two bundles,
comprised of one item each, i.e.
B = {{Asphalt}, {Concrete}}.
Both bundles have the same attributes,

({Asphalt}) = ({Concrete}) = (Time, Prize),
being the delivery time and the charged prize. The attribute values shall be equal, e.g.

(({Asphalt})) = (({Concrete})) = (30.0, 70.0),
where the units of the first and the second component are “minutes” and “Euro per
ton”, respectively. It is obvious that for an asphalt paving agent the utility for the asphalt delivery should be higher than the utility for the concrete delivery, although the
attributes and its values are exactly the same.
Example 2: Now let us consider the item set consisting of orders for diverse asphalt
types that are needed for a road’s base layer, binder layer and wearing layer respectively,
I = {Base, Binder, Wearing}.
They can be purchased individually or together, so the bundle set
B = {{Base}, {Binder}, {Wearing}, {Base, Binder, Wearing}}.
The single item bundles have all the same attributes,

({Base}) = ({Binder}) = ({Wearing}) = (Time, Prize).
The combined bundle has the attributes

({Base, Binder, Wearing}) = (Time1, Time2, Time3, Prize),
where the semantic of the Timei-values is the delivery time of one particular kind of
asphalt. In a similar way subsequently delivered batch orders could be represented,
e.g. with the item set
I = {Base1, Base2, Base3}.
Based on the notion above and on prior literature [6], we qualify the core properties of auctions by three criterions: (1) Number of items, (2) attribute set, and (3)
character.
(1) The number of items to be auctioned has a significant impact on the complexity of the winner determination problem. We only distinguish if single items are auc-
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tioned separately, or whether bids over bundles of items are possible. In the former
case B  I, by which we mean that  contains exactly the same amount of elements as
I and each element of B contains exactly one element of I. The latter case is referred
to as combinatorial auction, where the number of possible bundles, and hence the
search space for an optimal bid, may be exponential in the number of items. (2) The
attribute set states whether the auction consists of a single attribute or of multiple
attributes, i.e. whether M = 1. The former case corresponds to the idea of perfect
competition for a prize only. The interesting aspect in the latter case is to enable efficient outcomes with respect to the auctioneer’s and bidders’ prioritization of the attributes, which potentially allows for tradeoffs. (3) Therefore, we address also the
character of an auction, which can either be integrative or distributive. In distributive
auctions either the auctioneer wins and the bidders lose per bid or vice versa [19].
Integrative auctions offer the opportunity to find compromises between the auctioneer
and a bidder, which are not bound to the fixed pie assumption of distributive auctions,
i.e. win-win outcomes are possible. More formally, let ” and ’ be two distinct value
characteristics of a bid for a bundle b and a1, a2  A be two distinct agents. An auction is integrative if u(a1, ”) > u(a1,’)  u(a2, ”) > u(a2,’) is possible.
Based on that conceptualization our contribution is a single-item, multi-attribute,
integrative auction.
3.2

The Auction Model

The essential part for the design of the auction is the triple . This variable aggregates
an item bundle with its attributes and the respective attribute values. Since the auction
shall coordinate just-in-time deliveries, the item set contains an order for the delivery
of a resource, I = {Delivery order}. The bundle set contains only the one item,
B = {{Delivery order}}. The Delivery order here is rather a placeholder for an order
to deliver a particular resource, e.g. asphalt. Because there is solely one element in the
bundle set, we omit the explicit statement of the arguments for  and . It is unambiguous to what we refer respectively. Although we regard technically a single-item
auction we always refer to “the bundle” to retain stringency. The restriction to a single
item reduces complexity, but in principle our model allows for combinatorial auctions, too.
The attribute set C = {Prize, Quantity, Condition, Time, Place}. The attributes of
the bundle  = (Prize, Quantity, Condition, Time, Place). We use in the following the
respective first two letters as abbreviation, i.e. Pr, Qu, Co, Ti, Pl. The value range of
each attribute c  C is given by Yc. We require that each Yc  IR, so each attribute
must be mapped to a real number. The satisfaction of this requirement is not straightforward regarding the attributes Condition and Place. A place is usually given by a
Cartesian product of two or three real numbers specifying coordinates. However,
there is always a natural possibility to express the distance to a reference point with
one sole real number. One can consider the shortest path in a road network to the
reference point, or the time that is needed to get there, or even the consumption of
fuel. No matter which projection is used, information will be lost. Still, for our purpose the one-dimensional distance to a reference point is sufficient. The reference
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point is the aspired place of delivery. Bidders can bid for the distance to that reference
point as delivery place. In cases where the place is not subject for negotiation the only
accepted distance is zero.
The attribute describing the condition poses more difficulties. First of all it is not
always straightforward to assess the condition of a resource quantitatively. That is
why we introduce formally an auxiliary function that we call yCo and that returns a
real number as value for the Condition attribute. In the best case, yCo is a sensor which
returns a measurement directly, e.g. a temperature or a viscosity. The function may
however also be a mapping from qualitative attributes onto a real number. The latter
case is not straightforward, though.
The auction is carried out by an agent a  AA who demands a resource at a specific
time. To find the bidder who is best suited for the fulfillment of the demand, the auctioneer agent a scores the bids with a scoring function S :   IR. Based on the scoring function S the order is awarded to the bidder b*  AB who attains the highest
score. Please note that the scoring of a bid is not necessarily identical to the utility
from that bid. We take the scoring function as a technical means to map priorities on
the auction attributes. Since the co-domain of the scoring function S is IR, the array of
attribute values  must be mapped onto one sole number. A reduction of multiple
values to one value is non-trivial because information is lost inevitably. Our general
approach is to score each attribute value c individually, and to connect the individual
scores Sc(c) with a commutative, associative operator “◦”.
S() = SPr(Pr) ◦ SQu(Qu) ◦ SCo(Co) ◦ STi(Ti) ◦ SPl(Pl).
Commutativity and associativity make sure that the order, in which the individual
scoring functions are computed, is irrelevant. We use the simple additive operation:
S() = SPr(Pr) + SQu(Qu) + SCo(Co) + STi(Ti) + SPl(Pl) =

 S (
c

c

).

cC

With the additive operation the score of each attribute is considered independently.
Hence, one particularly favorable attribute value can potentially compensate for an
attribute with a low score. When used, for instance, the multiplication, then the entire
scoring S() converged to zero as soon as the score of one single attribute value becomes close to zero. Consecutively, the scoring functions need to be designed.
3.3

The Scoring Rules

Basically, the linear scoring rule scores the deviation of an attribute value from the
aspired value  copt for the corresponding attribute c. The minimum and maximum
attribute values are defined by  cmin and  cmax . It is  cmin   copt   cmax and the value
range Yc = [  cmin ,  cmax ]. Note, that the value range of the attributes is the domain of
the scoring function. The weighting factor c constitutes at the same time the maximum score for the attribute c. The linear scoring rule for the individual attributes c
reads:
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Fig. 1. Linear scoring function with different weighting factors (for the Time attribute)


 c   cmin


 c opt
min
c
  c  max
 c  c

Sc ( c )  c  opt
max
  c  c
c



, cmin   c   copt
, copt   c   cmax
, c   copt
, otherwise

For the score at the interval boundaries it always holds  cmin   cmax  0 . The maximum score is only realized for the aspired attribute value Sc ( copt )  c . The explicit
definition of the case for  c   copt allows to set  cmin   copt , or  copt   cmax , or

 cmin   copt   cmax . Fig. 1 depicts the function graph of two instances of the linear
scoring rule for the attribute c = Time. Both graphs are underlay with  Timin  20 ,

 Tiopt  40 , and  Timax  50 , but the black graph is underlay with the weighting factor
Ti = 1 and the gray graph is underlay with the weighting factor Ti = 3. A deviation
from the aspired attribute value is penalized linearly. If Sc(c) =  then the value of
the attribute c is out of the settlement range. The settlement range is described by
Walton & McKersie [19] and we adopted the concept in the following way: An
agreement for the bundle can only be settled if  c  C : c  Yc. That means, if bidders make an offer where at least one attribute value is beyond the auctioneer’s acceptable value range, then there is no agreement for the bundle at all.
The linear scoring rule cannot express that the marginal scores may be dependent
of the current score of the respective attribute value. A deviation around the optimal
attribute value shall potentially have a smaller effect than the same deviation at the
interval boundaries. A nearby enhancement of linear models is the extension to a
second-degree polynomial. Therefore, we posit the following (mathematical) conditions:
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(1)

S c ( cmin / max )

 a  ( cmin / max ) 2

(2) S c ( copt )
 a  ( copt ) 2
d
(3)
S c ( copt )  a  2 copt
d c

!

 b  cmin / max

 c  0

 b  copt

 c  c

 b

!
!

 0

In expression (1) either  cmin or  cmax is applied, according to whether the left-hand
or the right-hand interval is determined. The expression ensures that the score at the
interval boundaries is zero. Expression (2) ensures that the aspired attribute value gets
the maximum score. In difference to the linear model, there is a third degree of freedom. With expression (3) we define that the marginal score is zero for the aspired
attribute value. This claim has two reasons. On the one hand, the formal justification
is that there is no other optimum than the score at the aspired attribute value. That
holds even without restricting the domain. On the other hand, the claim implies the
following property: The nearer an attribute value converges to the aspired value, the
less is the increment of the score. And for the aspired attribute value the marginal
increment is zero ultimately. On the other side, the more an attribute value diverges
from the optimum value, the higher is the penalization. The implication is that it is
harder to compensate bad attribute values (around  cmin / max ) than to get additional
scores from good attribute values (around  copt ). In terms of utilities the property is
known as risk avoidance. Solving the parameters a, b, c yields the quadratic scoring
rule:

      opt  2 
c
c  1   c
 
    copt   cmin  

 
      opt  2 
c
S c ( c )    1   c
 
 c    copt   cmax  

 
c



, cmin   c   copt
, copt   c   cmax
, c   copt
, otherwise

Fig. 2 depicts the quadratic scoring rule (black graph) in comparison with the linear
scoring rule (gray graph), again for the Time attribute, but here with Ti = 2.
The score of the quadratic rule is steadily above the linear scoring, when considering the same weighting factors and interval boundaries. The important property, however, is that the quadratic scoring rule converges smoothly towards the optimum and
diverges disproportionally in the other direction.
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Fig. 2. Quadratic and linear scoring function in comparison (for the Time attribute)

4

Artifact Evaluation

4.1

Simulation Plan

The evaluation is aligned towards the research question: What is the effect of using
the multi-attribute scoring rules for auctions for just-in-time deliveries? We subdivided the research question into three operational questions Q1 – Q3.
Q1: How does the variation of the weighting factor c affect the outcome for the attribute value c? In particular, we focus on c = Time, but also on c = Condition.
Q2: How does the variation of the weighting factor c affect the outcome for the
other attribute values −c?
Q3: What is the difference between the linear scoring rule and the quadratic scoring rule with respect to Q1 and Q2.
So, the independent variables are the weighting factors for the Time attribute, and
in an additional evaluation for the Condition attribute, too. The dependent variables
are the (relative) deviations from the aspired values for each attribute. To answer the
research questions Q1 – Q3 we conducted a simulation of the artifact with artificial
data. So as to diminish the probability of pure coincidental results we used the averages of 1000 runs. With the confidence level of 99% the averages are less than 0.5
around the true mean for the Time attribute. The attribute values were drawn randomly from the settlement range Yc for each of the n agents in each run. For the possible
attribute values we used a uniform distribution with an integer step width of 1.
The parameterization of the simulation is based on a road pavement scenario. The
condition of delivered asphalt is described by its temperature and plays a crucial role.
For the sake of comparability, we normalized the resulting deviations with the highest
possible deviation for the corresponding attribute value. We assume that the place is
min
opt
max
not subject for negotiation, and hence we state YPl = {0},  Pl
  Pl
  Pl
 0 . That
is, any deviation from Pl = 0 excludes the respective bid from the settlement range.
By assumption, we regard only accepted bids, and thus omitted the Place attribute.
The parameters for the other attributes were set as follows.

100

Prize € p. ton
Quantity tons
Condition C
Time minutes

 Prmin
min
 Qu
min
 Co
 Timin

0
 10
 100
 20

 Propt
opt
 Qu
opt
 Co
 Tiopt

0
 25
 120
 40

 Prmax
max
 Qu
max
 Co
 Timax

 100
 25
 160
 50

,
,
,
.

The number of bidders has naturally a positive impact on the efficiency of the results. The higher the number is, the higher is the competition. For our simulation, this
fact has been incorporated by the uniformly randomized choice of the attribute values.
The more bidders are simulated, the higher is the probability that the optimal bid is
drawn. We took n = 8 delivery agents, respectively bidders, for our simulation setting,
which reflects a realistic number of available dumpers at a medium sized road pavement site.
To capture the efficacy of our coordination artifact we compare the outcomes of
the simulation with the expected values of the applied stochastic distribution. Since
we used a discrete uniform distribution, the relative expected value of the deviation
from the optimal attribute value is given by
 cmax



 copt   c

1


 c    max

 c   cmin  1 max copt   cmin , cmax   copt 
c

min
c

The last term of the expression normalizes the absolute deviation of the respectively aspired attribute value onto the interval [0, 1]. The resulting means are (rounded
where necessary)

 Qu  50%,  Co  42.21%,  Pr  50%,  Ti  42.74%.
Basically, these benchmarks reflect a purely stochastically random allocation of the
transport orders. The reason for the usage however is this: When weighting one particular attribute highly, we seek to figure out whether the outcome for the other attributes becomes worse than with a random allocation. Negation of this statement provides evidence for the effectivity of our artifact. As a motivational explanation, consider also the case where the transport orders are allocated beforehand in the long
term, with respect to a fixed plan. Eventually, the occurrence of stochastic environmental disturbances is equivalent to a random allocation of the transport orders. Our
artifact enables for short-term allocations and overcomes defects of that kind.
4.2

Simulation Results

Fig. 3 shows the resulting relative deviation for a ceteris paribus evaluation, where
only the weighting factor of the Time attribute is varied. The other attribute values are
set to 1 constantly. The results for the linear scoring rule are depicted as solid line.
The dashed line depicts the results for the quadratic scoring rule. Regarding Q1 and
Q2 the results match our expectation: Raising the weight for one attribute decreases
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Fig. 3. Relative deviations from the aspired attribute values in dependence of the weighting
factor for the Time (the other weighting factors are 1)

the average deviation at the cost of the average deviation for the other attributes. We
can now quantify to what amount the variation of the weighting factor comes into
effect. We describe in the following the results for the linear scoring rule.
The Time deviation converges to 10%, which is an improvement of 15% compared
to the deviation with Ti = 1. The deviation for the Quantity and the Prize converges
to approx. 47%, which is a decline of about 20% compared to the smallest deviation,
but still is slightly better than with a purely stochastic winner determination. The
Condition converges to 40% declining by 15%, which is slightly better than the random allocation, too. The results, however, suggest to choose a weighting factor of 8
for the Time attribute, when the other attributes are weighted with 1, because the results for the Time deviation do not improve substantially for weights greater than 8.
Regarding Q3, the results show that the effect of varying the weighting factor is
more relaxed for the quadratic scoring rule as compared to the linear scoring rule. On
the one hand, the improvement for the Time deviation is slightly worse than with the
linear scoring rule. On the other hand, the decline for the other attributes is strictly
better than with the linear scoring rule. The loss of improvement for the Time attribute
is less than the savings from the decline for the other attributes. However, the total
savings add up to about only 2% – 3%.
Because in our scenario case not only the requirement of a just-in-time delivery is
crucial, but also the condition, i.e. the temperature, we inquired what happens if both
the weighting factors for the Time attribute and the Condition attribute are varied
simultaneously, i.e. both attributes are weighted with the same factor. Fig. 4 shows
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Fig. 4. Relative deviations from the aspired attribute values with simultaneous variation of the
weighting factors for the Time and the Condition (the other weighting factors are 1)

the corresponding results. Now, the Time deviation converges only to approx. 17%.
And the Condition deviation has now nearly exactly the same results as the Time deviation. For the benefits of the Time and the Condition attribute the other attributes
converge now to 50%, and hence converge to the expected value with random winner
determination. Nonetheless, they do not exceed the purely stochastically expected
deviations. So, the decline for the Quantity, Prize, and Time deviation is only 3%, but
the improvement for the Condition attribute is considerable high. That means, the
consideration of a side constraint for just-in-time deliveries is effectively facilitated
by our artifact. However, the results indicate that the relaxing effect of the quadratic
scoring rule diminishes when weighting several attributes simultaneously.

5

Conclusion and Outlook

This research proposes a linear and a quadratic multi-attribute scoring rule for the
coordination of just-in-time deliveries with an auction. The attributes for the auction
reflect the general requirements for just-in-time deliveries. We have simulated our
artifact to evaluate its usefulness and efficacy. We could indicate that the artifact facilitates an advantageous allocation of delivery orders. This holds in particular with
respect to a side constraint (here: the Condition of the delivered asphalt, given by its
temperature). With sole respect to the weighting factor of the Time attribute, we
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showed that the quadratic scoring rule has a relaxing effect in terms of the expected
deviations from the aspired attribute values.
The coordination method accompanies a flexibilization of the order retrievals. This
is in particularly beneficial to avoid tailbacks. A tailback arises, among others, due to
the lack of storage place. In our pavement example, a tailback would lead to a binding
of the important transport vehicles, so that shortages are the consequence.
The generally tightened competition accentuates JiT requirements for logistics
providers of several industries. Mail order companies, for instance, increase their
competitiveness when they deliver the orders at a point in time which is preferred by
the receivers. To that end, the mail order companies can potentially choose among
various deliverers. The challenge is to select the best-suited deliverer.
We see three research tasks to address limitations of our work: (1) We used a simple additive operation for the multi-attribute scoring and polynomial functions. There
might be other operations or functions with different properties to inquire. (2) We
evaluated a single-item auction although our model allows for combinatorial auctions,
too. The question for just-in-time deliveries is, how to design a combinatorial auction
to obtain optimal delivery sequences. (3) So far, we assumed truth telling for the bidders. In fact, that reliance cannot be presupposed. Further investigation must be focused on the inducement of incentive compatibility. In case of strategic bidders, the
mechanism is exposed to the danger of failure.
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